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Supreme Court No. 2007 0559-SC 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF 
BUSHCO, d.b.a. BABYDOLL ESCORTS, ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
The American Civil Liberties Union of Utah ("ACLU of Utah") is a nonprofit, 
nonpartisan membership organization, founded in 1958. The ACLU of Utah is the state 
affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), which was founded in 1920 to 
protect and advance civil liberties throughout the United States. The ACLU has more 
than 300,000 members nationwide. The ACLU of Utah has more than 2,200 members. 
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The ACLU of Utah has been involved extensively in litigation and advocacy to 
protect the rights of speakers under the First Amendment. For instance, the ACLU of 
Utah is currently plaintiff and counsel in The King's English v. Shurtleff, 2:05-cv-00485-
DB, a federal lawsuit challenging a variety of restrictions on Internet speech. 
Additionally, the ACLU of Utah has been involved in a myriad of cases to protect and 
uphold the First Amendment rights of Utah citizens, including the right to display signs, 
and protest in public fora. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Amicus curiae adopt the appellants' statement of facts concerning the events 
resulting in this proceeding. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Title 59, Chapter 27 of the Utah Code allows the state of Utah ("the State") to 
place a severe financial burden on entities, solely on the basis of the content of the speech 
in which they engage. The speech in question, nude dancing, is afforded First 
Amendment protection under the United States Constitution. Content-based tax schemes 
are subject to strict scrutiny. Therefore, Title 59, Chapter 27 of the Utah Code cannot be 
upheld as constitutional unless the State can assert a compelling interest in selectively 
taxing entities based on content, and can demonstrate that the law implementing such 
action is narrowly tailored to achieve this end. The State cannot meet this heavy burden, 
as it cannot demonstrate that its interest in reducing the number of and providing 
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treatment for sex offenders in Utah justifies taxing businesses because they engage in a 
particular expressive message. 
Even if this Court determines that Title 59, Chapter 27 of the Utah Code is a 
content-neutral regulation, the State cannot rely on its alleged interest in combating the 
secondary effects associated with sexually explicit businesses. The Utah Legislature did 
not rely on any evidence which demonstrates a reasonable believable connection between 
sexually explicit businesses and the incidence of sex offense. 
Finally, if Title 59, Chapter 27 of the Utah Code is a content-neutral regulation, it 
cannot survive intermediate scrutiny as it is so broadly worded that it subjects lawful 
expressive conduct, such as theater and dance productions, to taxation, despite the fact 
that such activities clearly have no relation to the social ills the State claims it is targeting 
by way of this regulation. Accordingly, under either strict or intermediate scrutiny, Title 
59, Chapter 27 of the Utah Code must fail as an unconstitutional violation of the First 
Amendment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. TITLE 59 CHAPTER 27 OF THE UTAH CODE IS A CONTENT-
BASED REGULATION, WHICH SHOULD BE EVALUATED 
UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY REVIEW. 
A. Title 59 Chapter 27 Of The Utah Code Targets Expressive Conduct Protected By 
The First Amendment. 
Title 59 Chapter 27 of the Utah Code, entitled "Sexually Explicit Business and 
Escort Service Tax/5 (hereafter "the SEB Tax") is a content-based regulation that 
impermissibly imposes a substantial financial burden on speech, not merely conduct. The 
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First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST, amend. I. The United States 
Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to mean that "government has no 
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its 
contents." Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); see also Regan v. 
Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984). Furthermore, the Court has indicated that with 
respect to financial regulations, "differential taxation of First Amendment speakers is 
constitutionally suspect when it threatens to suppress the expression of particular ideas or 
viewpoints." Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991). Thus, tax schemes that 
attempt to impose penalties on entities singled out based on the content of their speech 
cannot survive constitutional scrutiny, absent a compelling state interest and 
demonstration that the regulation is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest. Arkansas 
Writers9Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987). 
In the context of sexually oriented businesses, the First Amendment's prohibition 
on selective taxation based on content does not change. In City of Los Angeles v. 
Alameda Books, Inc., a case concerning regulation of sexually explicit businesses, the 
Court specifically addressed the impropriety of imposing taxes based on the content of 
speech. 535 U.S. 425, 445 (2002) ("A city may not regulate the secondary effects of 
speech by suppressing the speech itself. A city may not, for example, impose a content-
based fee or tax. This is true even if the government purports to justify the fee by 
reference to secondary effects."). The Court's conclusion in this respect was motivated 
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by a concern that absent such a rule, a governmental entity might attempt to reduce 
secondary effects by reducing protected speech. Id. 
Here, the Court's concern is abundantly warranted. The SEB Tax applies 
selectively, based solely on the protected content of communication of the First 
Amendment speaker. For example, a semi-nude dancing establishment is subject to the 
SEB tax on the basis of its chosen content (partially nude dance expression1) while a fully 
clothed dancing establishment is immune from regulation. Examining the content of an 
entity's message to ascertain tax liability is exactly the sort of evil the First Amendment 
sought to protect against. See Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 229 (invalidating a 
tax scheme as unconstitutional where "the basis on which [the state] differentiates 
between magazines is particularly repugnant to First Amendment principles: a 
magazine's tax status depends entirely on its content'"). 
Because the SEB Tax as enacted requires selective application based on content, 
the government must demonstrate that the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. In cases where the government 
has asserted a compelling interest, but has been unable to demonstrate a connection 
between the interest and the resulting selective action, regulations have been invalidated. 
See e.g. Arkansas Writers 'Project, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (recognizing state interest in 
raising revenue, but disavowing any relationship between the interest and selective 
1
 Nude dancing is entitled to federal constitutional protection. See City of Erie v. Pap ys 
A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 
(1991). As such, the First Amendment prohibits the government from either restricting 
or unduly burdening nude dancing based on the content of the speech itself. Id. 
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taxation); Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota Comm V of Rev., 460 U.S. 575, 586 (1983); 
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467-469 (1980) (acknowledging the State's interest in 
preserving privacy by prohibiting residential picketing, but refusing to permit the State to 
ban only nonlabor picketing); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 
120 (1991) (agreeing that State had a compelling interest in transferring the proceeds of 
crime from criminals to their victims, but invalidating a statute which required that 
accused or convicted criminal's income from works describing his crime be made 
available to victims of crime). 
The Utah State Legislature undoubtedly has a compelling interest in treating the 
growing number of sex offenders within its borders. Sexually Explicit Business Tax and 
Escort Service Tax: Hearing on H.B. 239 Before H. Revenue and Taxation Comm., 2004 
Leg., 55th Leg. Body (Ut. 2004) (statement of Rep. Duane Bourdeaux, member, H. 
Comm. on Law Enforcement and Crim. Justice). Moreover, it has an interest in raising 
revenue to obtain the funds necessary to provide such treatment. The State is not 
justified, however, in singling out entities to tax for this purpose, when the method of 
selection is done on the basis of constitutionally protected content. 
B. Title 59 Chapter 27 Of The Utah Code Impermissibly Targets Speech, And Not 
Secondary Effects, As The Legislature Did Not Rely On Evidence That 
Demonstrates A Reasonable Believable Connection Between The Speech In 
Question And The Purported Secondary Effects Of That Speech: Sexual Offense. 
Even if this Court determines that the SEB Tax is content-neutral, and was passed 
for the purpose of targeting negative secondary effects, the State has not met its burden of 
demonstrating that in passing House Bill 239 (the bill underlying the SEB Tax), it relied 
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upon any evidence "reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that [the bill] 
addresses. City ofRenton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986). 
The United States Supreme Court has held that where government restrictions on 
public nudity can be classified as content-neutral, they are evaluated under the O 'Brien 
intermediate scrutiny framework. See Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 289. A regulation 
survives the O 'Brien test if 1) it is within the constitutional power of the Government to 
enact the statute, 2) the statute will further a substantial government interest, 3) the 
governmental interest is not substantially related to the suppression of free speech, and 4) 
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is 
essential to the furtherance of that interest. O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 377 
(1968). 
In developing the body of its First Amendment jurisprudence, however, the 
Supreme Court has wrestled with setting the standard necessary to establish the second 
prong in the O 'Brien framework: the regulation serves a substantial government interest. 
See e.g. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 438 (holding that a "municipality can[not] get 
away with shoddy data or reasoning. The municipality's evidence must fairly support the 
municipality's rationale for its ordinance."); Turner Broad. Sys.f Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 
622, 664 (1994) (finding that the burden of proof is on the government to "demonstrate 
that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact 
alleviate these harms in a direct and material way."); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 583-86 (Souter, 
J., concurring) (concluding that the city was required to show secondary effects of the 
type relied upon in Renton, and not merely an interest in order and morality); Renton, 475 
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U.S. at 51-52 (stating that "The First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting 
such an ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that 
already generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is 
reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.) (emphasis 
added). 
Thus, in the wake of Alameda Books, courts give considerable deference to the 
determinations of cities and governmental entities as to their rationale in enacting 
regulations that impact speech, so long as such entities can establish that they relied on at 
least some concrete evidence in support of their decision. Heideman v. South Salt Lake 
City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1199-1185, 1200 (10th Cir. 2003) (upholding a nudity ban as a 
constitutional content-neutral regulation targeting secondary effects where ban was 
enacted based on police reports and studies gathered by the city for over a year 
"regarding the connection between sexually oriented commercial business and [the] 
secondary effects [the city sought to combat.]"; AAK, Inc. v. City ofWoonsocket, 830 
F.Supp.99, 103-04 (D.R.I. 1993) (finding city licensing ordinance violated the First 
Amendment by charging higher fee for adult dancing license than for other dancing 
establishments and where city did not rely on any evidence of link between secondary 
effects and speech in enacting the scheme). 
For example, in AAK, a city's licensing scheme was found unconstitutional where 
it set a higher fee for adult cabaret entertainment licenses than for other dancing 
establishments. Id. At 101-02. The court held that the ordinance violated the First 
Amendment on its face because it regulated on the basis of content. Id. at 103. 
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Additionally, the city could not claim that the ordinance was enacted to target secondary 
effects associated with adult cabaret establishments, as "the City conducted no 
investigation of any type prior to enacting this ordinance" and there were no "special law 
enforcement problems associated with [these establishments]." Id. at 104. Indeed, the 
court specifically noted that the "only justification offered by the city for the ordinance 
was its interest in 'societal order and morality,'"and that this was not sufficient to 
withstand constitutional muster. Id. 
When the Utah Legislature ("the Legislature") passed House Bill 239, it created a 
law whereby controversial but constitutionally protected speech is singled out to be 
burdened by a substantial tax , simply because the content of that speech is disfavored. 
The Legislature asserted that the purpose of the law is to target the negative secondary 
effects associated with sexually explicit businesses, namely sex offenses. However, the 
Legislature made no attempt to ascertain any correlation between the number of sex 
offenders and the protected speech engaged in by so called sexually explicit businesses. 
Instead, at the House Committee Hearing, held on February 3,2004, the sponsor of 
House Bill 239, Representative Duane Bourdeaux, merely asserted that "while most 
2
 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-27-103(1) (2004) (A tax is imposed on a sexually explicit 
business equal to 10% of amounts paid to or charged by the sexually explicit 
business for the following transactions: (a) an admission fee; (b) a user fee; (c) a retail 
sale of tangible personal property made within the state; (d) a sale of: (i) food and food 
ingredients as defined in Section 59-12-102; or (ii) prepared food as defined in Section 
59-12-102; (e) a sale of a beverage; and (f) any service.) (emphasis added) 
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individuals who use sexually oriented businesses do not commit sex crimes, much like 
most people who smoke don't get cancer for those who do[sic], many sex offenders 
utilize these types of services." Sexually Explicit Business Tax and Escort Service Tax: 
Hearing on H.B. 239 Before H. Revenue and Taxation Comm., 2004 Leg., 55th Leg. 
Body (Ut. 2004) (statement of Rep. Duane Bourdeaux, member, H. Comm. on Law 
Enforcement and Crim. Justice). Additionally, the only study brought to the attention of 
the Legislature concluded that "a cause and effect" exists between paraphilia and sex 
offenders. Id, (statement of Kathy Okey, Utah Department of Corrections) Paraphilia is 
defined as "a pattern of recurring sexually arousing mental imagery or behavior that 
involves unusual and especially socially unacceptable sexual practices (such as sadism or 
pedophilia)." Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2007). Markedly absent from the legislative record is any evidence connecting 
sexually explicit businesses with paraphilia, or with any other negative effects. 
Thus, the State has failed to establish that it relied on reasonably believable 
evidence in passing the SEB Tax. As such, the assertion that the law exists solely to 
combat the negative secondary effects related to sexual explicit businesses is flawed and 
unsupported. Absent secondary effects as a rationale, the SEB Tax appears to be nothing 
more than a regulation aimed at driving an unpopular form of expressive conduct out of 
business by way of an unduly burdensome tax. 
C. Even If The State's Purported Goal Of Combating Secondary Effects Is Valid, 
Chapter 59, Title 27 Imposes A Substantial Restriction On Appellants' First 
Amendment Freedoms, Which Is Greater Than Necessary To The Furtherance Of 
Its Interests. 
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Again, assuming arguendo, that the SEB Tax is deemed a content neutral 
regulation, it must also satisfy the fourth prong of the O'Brien test: the incidental 
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of the government's interest. 391 U.S. at 377. The SEB Tax cannot meet 
this standard. 
In evaluating regulations with respect to this fourth prong, the Court has 
repeatedly announced that "even content-neutral regulations must be 'narrowly tailored' 
to advance the interest asserted by the State. A regulation is not 'narrowly tailored'-even 
under the more lenient [standard applicable to content-neutral restrictions]-where ... a 
substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance [the State?s content-
neutral] goals." Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 122, n.* (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (citations omitted) 
("Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect. Precision of 
regulation must be the touchstone...."). 
Likewise, in cases dealing specifically with sexually explicit business restrictions, 
courts have held that regulations that "punish[ ] a 'substantial' amount of protected free 
speech, 'judged in relation to [their] plainly legitimate sweep," are unconstitutionally 
overbroad. Conchatta Inc. v. Miller, 458 F.3d 258, 268 (3rd Cir. 2006); see also Odle v. 
Decatur County, Tenn., 421 F.3d 386, 399 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding an ordinance 
unconstitutionally overbroad because i t " 'makes no attempt to regulate only those 
expressive activities associated with harmful secondary effects and includes no limiting 
provisions. Instead, [it] sweeps within its ambit expressive conduct not generally 
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associated with' the kinds of harmful secondary effects it was designed to prevent.") 
(citations omitted); Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 516-17 (4th Cir. 
2002) (finding likelihood of success on overbreadth claim where liquor-license regulation 
swept "far beyond bars and nude dancing establishments" to burden "a multitude of 
mainstream musical, theatrical, and dance productions-from musical comedy to ballet to 
political satire to flamenco dance"); Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831, 849 
(7th Cir. 2000)("When the government restricts speech not associated with harmful 
secondary effects, then the government cannot be fairly said to be regulating with those 
secondary effects in mind and the regulation extends beyond its legitimate reach."). 
The SEB Tax, like many of the regulations that have been struck down as 
unconstitutionally overbroad in other jurisdictions, potentially applies to many 
establishments whose activities have no relationship to the State's interest in combating 
the alleged social ills attendant to sexually explicit businesses. The language of the SEB 
Tax demonstrates that it applies to any business 
at which any nude or partially denuded individual, 
regardless of whether the nude or partially denuded individual 
is an employee of the sexually explicit business or an 
independent contractor, performs any service: (a) personally 
on the premises of the sexually explicit business; (b) during at 
least 30 consecutive or nonconsecutive days within a calendar 
year; and (c) for: (i) a salary; (ii) a fee; (iii) a commission; 
(iv) hire; (v) profit; or (vi) any amount similar to an amount 
listed in this Subsection (4)(c). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-27-102(4) (emphasis added). 
Nothing in the language of the SEB Tax prevents its application to theater, dance 
or other art groups, models hired to pose for art classes or any other legitimate form of 
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expression that involves nudity. With respect to these forms of entertainment in 
particular, it would no doubt prove difficult to procure evidence establishing that the SEB 
Tax prevents the secondary effects of sexual offense. Accordingly, because the SEB Tax 
sweeps more broadly and impacts more protected speech than necessary to accomplish 
the State's goal of reducing and treating sex offenses, the SEB Tax cannot survive even 
the more lenient O 'Brien intermediate level of scrutiny. As such, it must be declared 
unconstitutional. 
3
 Art is of course, entitled to full First Amendment protection. See Nat'l Endowment for 
the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 603 (1998) ("art is entitled to full protection because our 




The central tenant of the First Amendment is to protect the right of citizens and 
entities to engage in unpopular speech. Thus, any action by the government to interfere 
with this right and to discriminate on the basis of the content of speech undermines this 
protection. Government is entitled to enact laws to protect its citizens from social ills, 
but must do so in a way that is narrowly tailored to target only that conduct that is 
problematic, and that preserves the ability of entities to engage in protected speech. For 
these reasons, as well as those set forth in Appellants' brief, we urge the Court to find 
that the SEB Tax is an unconstitutional violation of Appellant's First Amendment Rights. 
Dated this 16th day of November, 2007. 
American Civil Liberties Foundation of Utah, Inc. 
^ /V&n g^ 
Marina Baginsky Lowe 
AttonW for Amicus Curiae 
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